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This study examined children’s and young adults’ use of three mental capacity criteria
for treating an entity as one to which moral subjects have moral obligations, that is, as
having moral status. In line with philosophical theorizing, these criteria were the
capacity to (1) perceive; (2) suffer; and (3) think. In this study, 116 respondents aged 9 to
18 years old gave moral judgments and guilt and shame attributions in response to
stories about perpetrators whose behaviour negatively affected entities with different
mental capacities. The moral judgments revealed that 9-year-old children assigned
moral status primarily on the basis of the victimized entity’s ability to suffer. Eleven-year-
old children also used the ability to suffer, but they assigned additional moral status
when the victimized entity was able to perceive. Young adults also used perception as a
criterion, but they assigned additional moral status when the victimized entity was
simultaneously able to suffer and able to think. When compared to their moral
judgments, the moral emotion attributions of respondents of all age groups were more
strongly affected by the victimized entity’s ability to think.
Many of the events that people take to be morally relevant involve a perpetrator causing
harm to a victim, which in turn causes suffering on the side of the victim. It is therefore
not surprising that much research on the development of moral awareness has focused
on how the moral judgments of children and adults about a perpetrator’s doings are
affected by (1) the perpetrator’s responsibility for harming the victim and (2) the
severity of the harm that is caused (e.g. Piaget, 1932; Yuill, 1984; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau,
* Correspondence should be addressed to Dr Tjeert Olthof, Department of Developmental Psychology, VU University
Amsterdam, Van der Boechorststraat 1, 1081 BT, Amsterdam, The Netherlands (e-mail: T.Olthof@psy.vu.nl).
The
British
Psychological
Society
233
British Journal of Developmental Psychology (2008), 26, 233–247
q 2008 The British Psychological Society
www.bpsjournals.co.uk
DOI:10.1348/026151007X216036
Copyright © The British Psychological Society
Reproduction in any form (including the internet) is prohibited without prior permission from the Society
1996). However, as is clear from Kahn’s (2006) overview of the development of
children’s moral relationships with nature, there is a third aspect of harmful morally
relevant events that is likely to affect people’s morally charged reactions to such events.
Specifically, such reactions also depend on their explicit or implicit ideas about
whether the victimized entity belongs to the category of entities to which moral
subjects have moral obligations, or, to use the term that is commonly used in the
branch of philosophy called ethics, to the category of entities having moral status
(Warren, 1997).
As is clear from discussions in ethics, a key issue in this area concerns the criteria that
are used to credit an entity with moral status. As will be reviewed below, several such
criteria have been identified, but, being the products of philosophical reflection, they
have essentially been derived from the intuitions of a limited number of highly
sophisticated thinkers, which leaves it unclear whether these criteria are actually used
by ordinary people of different ages when reacting to cases of harm doing.
Unfortunately, few empirical researchers have systematically addressed the issue of
moral status assignment, especially from a developmental perspective. This relative lack
of attention is unfortunate because adults’ and children’s moral concerns about harming
non-human entities are likely to affect their attitude towards several important societal
issues, ranging from the acceptability of particular practices in the meat industry to the
use of chimpanzees in biomedical research. Based on these considerations, the aim of
the present study is to empirically examine whether the criteria that have figured most
prominently in the literature are actually used by children and young adults when
crediting an entity with moral status.
What are these criteria? Drawing from the literature on animal rights, Kahn (2006)
argued that some form of human obligation towards an entity arises from crediting that
entity with the ability to suffer or to feel pleasure or pain. In line with the writings in the
animal rights (Singer, 1975) and ethical (Warren, 1997) literatures, Kahn referred to this
ability as sentiency. However, because the dictionary meaning of this term is the ability
to have sensory experience, using it to refer to the ability to suffer might raise
misunderstandings. Accordingly, in the remainder of this paper we will use ability to
suffer, rather than sentiency.
As is clear from Warren’s (1997) overview of the moral status literature, the ability to
suffer has also figured prominently in discussions among ethicists and it has particularly
been defended by utilitarian philosophers like Bentham (1789) and Singer (1975).
However, as is also clear from Warren’s overview, others have defended both more and
less inclusive criteria. An extremely inclusive, and therefore rather impractical, criterion
is Albert Schweitzer’s reverence for life principle that assigns a moral status to every
single living organism. On the less inclusive side, and far more influential, is Immanuel
Kant’s requirement that the entity should be a moral subject herself which, according to
Kant, in turn requires that the entity (1) be rational and (2) have a free will, which
effectively excludes non-human beings from being credited with moral status. Because
the Kantian criterion stresses the entity’s rationality as a necessary condition for being
credited with moral status, we will refer to this criterion as the ability to think.
Moral status assignment need not be based on just one criterion. Warren (1997)
recommended a multi-criterion approach that includes several of the criteria that have
been proposed in the ethical literature. Accordingly, a simplified summary of the moral
status literature is that two types of mental capacities are important as potential criteria
for assigning moral status to an entity, i.e. the utilitarian criterion that the entity has to be
able to suffer and the Kantian criterion that the entity has to be able to think.
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Children and adults are known to attribute both mental capacities to at least some
non-human entities (Coley, 1995; Knight, Nunkoosing, Vrij, & Cherryman, 2003), but
what evidence is there that they acknowledge the moral relevance of both types of
attributions? The examples given by Kahn (2006) suggest that at least some children
acknowledge the moral relevance of the ability to suffer. In an empirical study, Herzog
and Galvin (1997) related adults’ estimates of the extent to which several species would
deserve moral consideration, to different types of attributions to those animals,
including the ability to suffer, cognitive capacities and attractiveness. Findings indicated
that the ability to suffer was more closely related to moral deservingness than the other
attributions, which suggests that for adults too the ability to suffer is an important
criterion for moral status assignment.
One reason for the importance of the ability to suffer might be the close relation
of this criterion with the central moral concept of harm. Specifically, causing harm to
an entity usually implies doing something that the affected entity considers
disagreeable and one could even argue that the claim that harm has been caused
to an entity implies the claim that the entity is able to suffer. Accordingly, it can
be expected that an entity’s ability to suffer is an important determinant of the
assignment of moral status to that entity for individuals of any age group. This is the
first hypothesis to be tested.
As is clear from the above discussion, there can hardly be any doubt that the ability to
suffer contributes to an entity’s moral status to some extent. Societal controversy arises,
however, regarding the claim of some vegetarians and animal rights activists that this
ability is sufficient to credit an entity with the moral status that we traditionally assign to
members of our own species. Their opponents would instead agree with Kant that such
a moral status should only be assigned to rational beings. Accordingly, for many
respondents, an entity’s thinking skills can be expected to provide at least some
contribution to the assignment of moral status to that entity. This expectation is
confirmed by utterances of some of Knight et al.’s (2003) adult respondents, who
acknowledged the moral relevance of animals’ ability to think.
Developmental theorizing about children’s moral development also leads us to
expect that being able to think is an important contributor to the assignment of moral
status and that the importance of this criterion increases with development. Specifically,
based on their reading of Piaget (1932), Davidson and Youniss (1995) argued that a
central moral norm is that one should respect persons. These authors further argued
that a child’s realization that particular individuals or categories of individuals actually
are persons who should be respected, results from cooperating with those individuals in
the construction of norms of social interaction, which is what normally happens when
two individuals interact. By grounding the concept of persons – that could in terms of
the present study be defined as those being assigned full moral status – in cooperative
interaction, Davidson and Youniss seem to imply that having advanced cognitive
capacities is essential for being recognized as a person, which in turn implies that the
ability to think is a likely contributor to the assignment of moral status. Davidson and
Youniss further argued that as children are likely to interact with increasingly diverse
others in the course of development, they have to continuously redefine and expand
their concept of persons. In terms of this account, children can be expected to
increasingly recognize the moral relevance of having the cognitive capacities that enable
an individual to cooperatively interact with others. Accordingly, our second hypothesis
is that the importance of an entity’s ability to think, as a criterion for the assignment of
moral status, increases with age.
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Based on the above ideas, the present study is aimed to examine the development of
moral status assignment. Specifically, we ask whether the moral status that individuals of
different ages assign to an entity depends on whether the individual believes that the
entity is (1) able to suffer and (2) able to think. In addition, a third type of mental
capacity is included in the studies, i.e. whether an entity has perceptual abilities. Having
such abilities can be taken as an indication that the entity is an animate living being
(Jonas, 1966), which in and of itself can be expected to earn the entity some moral status
(Warren, 1997).
To address these issues, we asked respondents of different ages to react to stories
about a human protagonist whose behaviour physically affected several entities that
were specifically called into existence for the purposes of the study and that were thus
unknown to the respondents. Previously non-existent – rather than natural – entities
were used to ensure that no a priori knowledge about the affected entities would
influence the respondents’ reactions. To be able to examine the importance of each
criterion, we manipulated the affected entities’ mental capacities. One way to assess the
moral status that respondents assigned to each entity would have been to subsequently
ask how much consideration each entity would deserve when seen from a moral
perspective (cf. Herzog & Galvin, 1997). While this seems a straightforward way to
measure moral status assignment, we considered this question far too abstract for the
use with children. Instead we asked our respondents another question, i.e. how wrong
they considered the behaviour of the protagonists towards each of the entities to be,
which enabled us to examine the effect of the mental capacity manipulation on the
respondents’ moral judgments. This design ensures that respondents’ differential moral
judgments about affecting each of the victimized entities can only be ascribed to their
differential assignment of moral status to those entities. Accordingly, moral judgments
serve as the first and primary measure of moral status assignment in this study.
In the literature, claims have been made that people’s moral judgments about an
event actually are a derivative of their affective reactions towards that event (e.g. Haidt,
2001; Hoffman, 2000). Such claims are still highly controversial (see, for example
Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004), but when valid, they might be taken to imply that
people’s moral attitude towards an event could also be assessed by measuring their
morally relevant affective reactions to the event. The two emotions that come to mind
first as indices of moral affect are empathy-based guilt and moral shame. Empathy-based
guilt arises when feeling empathic towards an entity that is negatively affected by one’s
own involvement in the causation of a moral wrong (Olthof, Ferguson, Bloemers, & Deij,
2004) and this type of guilt has been identified as a trulymoral emotion (Hoffman, 2000;
Olthof et al., 2004). Shame is less exclusively tied to morally relevant events, but when
occurring in response to such events, shame is highly related to guilt and can well be
seen as another morally charged emotional reaction to the event (Olthof et al., 2004).
Previous research has shown that children from 9 years onwards are well able to
attribute moral emotions to perpetrators of harm (Olthof, Schouten, Kuiper, Stegge, &
Jennekens-Schinkel, 2000; Olthof et al., 2004), indicating that both emotions can be
used to indicate school-aged children’s morally charged emotional reactions. Based on
these ideas, we included a second measure of moral status assignment, i.e. the
respondents’ attributions of guilt and shame to the perpetrator.
When constructing the stories for the present study, we restricted ourselves to using
cases of physical rather than psychological harm doing. This was done because using
psychological harm might well have elicited the respondents’ use of the thinking
criterion for a different reason than was implied in our second hypothesis. Specifically,
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as testified by the words of the biblical author Qoheleth that ‘ : : : in much wisdom is
much grief and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow’ (Ecclesiastes 1:18) it
is known for long that being able to think increases one’s ability to suffer. Accordingly,
any effects of an entity’s ability to think on respondents’ moral judgments about cases of
psychological harm doing would be ambiguous in terms of whether they would reflect
the respondents’ use of the thinking criterion in the Kantian sense, i.e. as a direct
contributor to moral status, or whether they would reflect their awareness that the
ability to think increases an entity’s ability to suffer.
In sum, 9-, 11- and 18-year-old respondents were presented with several stories in
which an imaginary protagonist potentially affects the well-being of a hypothetical
entity that is previously and unequivocally defined in terms of whether it (1) does or
does not have perceptual capacities; (2) is or is not able to suffer and (3) is or is not able
to think. Respondents were subsequently asked how wrong they considered the
protagonists’ behaviour to be and how guilty and ashamed the protagonists would feel.
Since the nature of the protagonists’ behaviour was kept constant across all stories,
differences between the entities in terms of the respondents’ responses can be
interpreted in terms of the moral status that respondents assigned to the entities on the
basis of their presumed mental capacities.
Method
Participants
Participants were 82 children from an elementary school in a medium-sized town in the
north-western part of the Netherlands, as well as 34 young adults. The adults were
recruited among final grade high-school students who paid a one-day visit to the campus
of the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam to orient themselves on the possibilities of studying
psychology, and among first-year students of subjects such as law, economy,
anthropology, etc., who were in the university main hall during a break between lectures.
The children were divided into two age groups: 9-year-olds (23 boys and 18 girls,
M ¼ 9 years 10 months, SD ¼ 5 months) and 11-year-olds (21 boys and 20 girls,
M ¼ 11 years 10 months, SD ¼ 4 months). The young adult group consisted of 15 males
and 19 females (M ¼ 18 years 4 months, SD ¼ 12 months).
Stories and design
The respondents were presented with stories in which an imaginary child protagonist’s
playing behaviour physically affects some unknown entity. The entities were labelled
using well-formed, but previously non-existing, Dutch nouns. No further information
was given about each entity except that a description was given of the entity’s mental
capacities. A straightforward way to test our hypotheses would be to use an orthogonal
design in which respondents are presented with all combinations of the three mental
capacities being or not being present. Nevertheless, we did not use such a design
because we feared that confronting children with the more exotic combinations of
factors (i.e. suffering or thinking entities that are unable to perceive, or a thinking entity
that is unable to perceive and that is not able to suffer) would confuse them to the point
of not being able to respond to the less exotic patterns. Accordingly we decided to test
the use of the three mental capacities by making particular planned comparisons
between the five relatively least exotic mental capacity patterns. These patterns
were (1) 000 ¼ perception absent, ability to suffer absent, thinking skills absent;
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(2) 100 ¼ perception present, ability to suffer absent, thinking skills absent; (3)
101 ¼ perception present, ability to suffer absent, thinking skills present; (4) 110 ¼
perception present, ability to suffer present, thinking skills absent and (5)
111 ¼ perception present, ability to suffer present, thinking skills present. It should
be noted that respondents could only use the mental capacity information to make any
further inferences about the affected entity, including whether the entity would or
would not be a living being.
To keep the respondents interested in the task, each mental capacity pattern was
combined with a different story theme. Across respondents the mental capacity patterns
were combined with story themes according to a Latin square design. The five story themes
were (1) bumping into the victimized entity when roller skating in a park; (2) hitting the
entity with a tennis racket; (3) hitting the entity with a skipping rope that came loose; (4)
hitting the entity with a Frisbee; and (5) kicking the entity with one’s feet while on a swing.
Because the design of the study required that the events would differ only in terms of
the mental capacities of the victimized entities, the protagonist’s responsibility for the
outcome was kept constant across story themes. Specifically, in all story themes it was
implied – but not said explicitly – that if the protagonist had taken more care, the event
might not have occurred. Accordingly, the perpetrator’s responsibility was fixed to the
level that responsibility researchers have called ‘foreseeable’ (Heider, 1958). As is true
for cases of accidental harm doing, foreseeably caused harm is unintentionally caused,
but it differs from accidentally caused harm in that the protagonist could have avoided
the negative outcome, for example by exerting more care. School-aged children are
known to give more harsh moral judgments in the case of foreseeable harm when
compared with accidentally caused harm (Olthof, Ferguson, & Luiten, 1989). Similarly,
adults have been shown to give higher ratings of guilt in the case of foreseeable harm
when compared with accidentally caused harm (Ferguson, Olthof, & Stegge, 1997;
McGraw, 1987). Accordingly, with a victimized entity having full moral status,
respondents can be expected to give moderately harsh moral judgments and moderately
high estimates of the perpetrator’s feelings of guilt, which leaves room for giving lower
judgments when the victimized entity is assigned less than full moral status.
The following example combines the roller skating story theme with the 110
(perception present, ability to suffer present and thinking skills absent) pattern of
mental capacity attributions: Jennifer is using her roller skates in the park. In the park
is also a nambo. Do you know what a nambo is? I don’t know either, but I do know
that nambos are able to see and hear and to feel pain, but that they are not able to
think. When Jennifer goes down a hill really fast, the road makes a bit of a bend.
Suddenly Jennifer sees the nambo. Jennifer bumps into the nambo with a big bang.
The nambo turns over and hits the road hard. After being presented with a story,
children were asked three questions, i.e. how wrong (original Dutch: slecht) they
considered the protagonist’s behaviour to be because of what happened to the entity,
how guilty the protagonist would feel, and how ashamed the protagonist would feel.
Procedure
The children were tested in their own classroom by a female graduate student who served
as the experimenter. The experimenter first trained children to use a visual representation
of a 5-point rating scale that was to be used later in the procedure. The scale consisted of a
‘staircase’ of five size-graduated vertical rectangles that were drawn next to each other. The
experimenter first pointed to the smallest and the largest rectangles and verbalized the
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appropriate labels (not at all wrong and very very wrong). She then explained how the
scale could be used, using a rating of how wrong it would be for a child to take sweets
without asking permission as an example. To further introduce the nature of the task, the
experimenter subsequently discussed two anchor stories that were designed to elicit the
use of both extremes of the wrongness scale. In the first of these, a child protagonist
carelessly kicks a heavy ball which then hurts a little boy who is standing nearby. In the
second anchor story, the ball lands on the rusty remains of an old bicycle that was lying
around. Informal observation of children’s responses confirmed that children tended to use
both extremes of the rating scale when evaluating these stories.
Testing then continued by presenting each child with one out of five versions of a
story booklet. Each page of the booklet contained one of the five story themes together
with the questions that were asked about each story. Story themes were presented in a
fixed order, but booklet versions differed in terms of how the story themes were
combined with the five mental capacity attribution patterns. Specifically, each story
theme was combined with each mental capacity pattern about equally often, which also
ensures that each mental capacity attribution pattern appeared about equally often in
each presentation order position.
The experimenter then read aloud the first story, while encouraging children to keep
track of the story by reading it for themselves at the same time. Because children were
presented with different mental capacity patterns due to the order manipulation, the
experimenter left a pause at the point where the information about the entity’s mental
capacities was to be presented and she encouraged children to read that information in
silence for themselves. To help children doing this, the stories in their booklets were
printed in such a way that the mental capacity information clearly stood out from the
rest of the story.
After reading each story, children were asked the three questions that were mentioned
above. The questions were read aloud, but they were also printed in the booklets. Each
question was accompanied by the visual representation of the rating scale that children
had learned to use before. The experimenter encouraged children to answer each
question by placing a cross in one of the vertical rectangles that constituted the scale. All
the five stories were presented in this manner. It was stressed that children were not
allowed to move on to the next page until the experimenter asked them to do so.
To test the young adult participants, they were handed a similar booklet as was used
with the children, the only difference being that the visual analogue of the rating scale
was substituted by a numerical rating scale ranging from 1 to 5 with the extremes being
labelled in the same way as in the children’s booklet. In addition, the adults received a
written instruction in which it was explained that the procedure was also used with
children, but that they themselves should answer the questions in accordance with their
current opinions and feelings, rather than in accordance with how they would have felt
when being a child. The adults read the stories on their own and they subsequently
answered the questions without the experimenter being involved.
Results
Wrongness judgments
The judgments of the wrongness of the perpetrator’s behaviour were analysed in a
3 (Age) £ 2 (Gender) £ 5 (Mental capacities ¼ 000 vs. 100 vs. 101 vs. 110 vs. 111)
mixed-design analysis of variance with Mental capacities as the within-subjects factor.
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The analysis yielded significant main effects of Mental capacities Fð4; 107Þ ¼ 21:32,
p , :001 and Age Fð2; 110Þ ¼ 4:67, p , .05, but both effects were qualified by a
significant interaction of Age £ Mental capacities Fð8; 212Þ ¼ 1:98, p ¼ :05. No other
effects reached significance.
To further explore the Age £ Mental capacities interaction, separate analyses
were carried out for each age group, with Mental capacities as the only factor. The
results of these analyses are presented in the rightmost column of Table 1. As can
be seen in Table 1, the effect of Mental capacities was significant for all age groups.
To examine how respondents in each age group differentiated between the entities
with different mental capacities, four planned contrasts were carried out. First, to
examine whether the ability to suffer would take prominence over the ability to
think as a criterion for assigning moral status, we examined whether affecting the
110 (perceiving-and-suffering) entity elicited more harsh moral judgments than
affecting the 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) entity. Second, to examine whether
children used the ability to think as a criterion, the 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) vs.
100 (perception-only) and the 111 (perceiving-and-suffering-and-thinking) vs. 110
(perceiving-and-suffering) contrasts were made. Finally, to examine whether
respondents also used perception as a criterion, the 100 (perception-only) entity
was contrasted with the 000 entity that lacked all mental capacities. When a
particular contrast was significant, this is indicated in Table 1 by inserting a smaller-
than sign between the particular pair of means.
As can be seen in Table 1, for both groups of children – but not for the young
adults – the contrast between the 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) vs. the 110
(perceiving-and-suffering) entity was significant, which indicates that for children
the ability to suffer outweighed the ability to think as a determinant of moral status.
For the 9-year-old children, the ability to suffer also was the only mental capacity
that significantly affected moral status assignment. For the 11-year-old children, the
contrast between affecting the 000 (no mental capacities) vs. 100 (perception-only)
entities also reached significance, which indicates that for these children an entity’s
moral status also depended on whether it had perceptual abilities. In sum, the
findings for the two groups of children indicate that they treated the ability to suffer
as a key determinant of moral status, but the eldest children also took the
victimized entity’s perceptual abilities into account. Remarkably, an entity’s ability to
think did not affect children’s wrongness judgments.
The pattern of findings for the young adults resembled that of the 11-year-old
children in that the contrast between affecting the 000 entity without any mental
capacities vs. the 100 (perception-only) entity was significant, indicating that the young
adults took the entity’s perceptual abilities into account when assigning moral status.
However, the young adults differed from the children in that they judged affecting the
100 (perception-only), 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) and 110 (perceiving-and-suffering)
entities to be about equally wrong. This indicates that for the young adults neither the
ability to suffer, nor the ability to think, had strong implications for an entity’s moral
status, at least when considered in isolation. However, as testified by the significant
contrast between affecting the 110 (perceiving-and-suffering) vs. the 111 (perceiving-
and-suffering-and-thinking) entities, the young adults did take the entity’s ability to think
into account, but only when the entity also was able to suffer. Accordingly, for the young
adults only the combination of the ability to suffer and the ability to think earned an
entity additional moral status over and above the moral status assigned to the
perception-only entity.
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Guilt and shame attributions
Children’s attributions of the emotions of guilt and shame were analysed in the same
way as their wrongness judgments, but the analyses on guilt and shame only yielded
significant effects of mental capacities with no other effects reaching significance. The
means corresponding to these effects as well as the ANOVA results are presented in
Table 2. To further examine how respondents differentiated between the victimized
entities when attributing emotions of guilt and shame, the same four planned contrasts
were carried out that were described when discussing the results for the wrongness
judgments. As before, the significance of each contrast is indicated in Table 2 by
inserting a smaller-than sign between the particular means that were contrasted.
As can be seen in Table 2, for guilt all four contrasts reached significance, which
indicates that respondents took all three mental capacities into account when
attributing the emotion of guilt to the perpetrator. The fact that the significant contrasts
included the 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) vs. 110 (perceiving-and-suffering) contrast
indicates that when attributing the emotion of guilt to the perpetrator respondents put
more weight on the ability to suffer when compared with thinking. For shame the
pattern was very similar to that obtained for guilt, with the exception that the 101 vs.
110 contrast was not significant. Although not shown in Table 2, an additional analysis
revealed that the 100 (perception only) vs. 110 (perceiving-and-suffering) contrast was
significant (p , :01). Accordingly, when attributing shame to the perpetrator,
respondents took all the three mental capacities into account, but without putting
extra weight on the ability to suffer.
Discussion
In line with our first hypothesis, the 9- and 11-year-old children’s ratings of the
wrongness of the protagonist’s behaviour and their attributions of the emotions of guilt
and shame to the protagonist indicate that the attribution of the ability to suffer to an
entity is a key determinant of children’s assignment of moral status. In addition, two
other findings are important. First, age-related differences were found with respect to
the use of all three mental capacity criteria when giving moral judgments and, second,
the use of these criteria depended on whether respondents gave moral judgments about
the perpetrator’s behaviour or whether they attributed moral emotions to the
perpetrator. Both types of findings will be discussed below.
For the 9-year-old children, the ability to suffer was the only criterion that
significantly affected their moral judgments. The 11-year-old children used both the
ability to suffer and perceptual abilities. Finally, the young adults also used the entity’s
perceptual abilities, but the ability to suffer only affected their moral judgments when
combined with the ability to think. This pattern of findings indicates that there was an
age-related decrease in the use of the ability to suffer as an independent criterion for the
assignment of moral status, as well as age-related increases in the use of perceptual
abilities and the ability to think, be it that the latter criterion was only used by the eldest
respondents and only when combined with the ability to suffer.
When taken together, these results both support and qualify our first hypothesis that
the ability to suffer is an important determinant of moral status assignment, the
qualification being that for the eldest respondents the ability to suffer only affected
moral status when combined with the ability to think. The findings also provide
qualified support for our second hypothesis, i.e. that the ability to think would be
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increasingly important over the course of development. Specifically, as is clear from
inspecting the 100 (perception-only) vs. 101 (perceiving-and-thinking) contrast in Table
1, the ability to think did not have an independent effect on moral status assignment for
any age group. However, inspection of the magnitude of the 110 (perceiving-and-
suffering) vs. 111 (perceiving-and-suffering-and-thinking) contrast for the three age
groups reveals that as an addition to the capacities of a perceiving-and-suffering entity,
the impact of the ability to think increased with respondent age. Accordingly, these
results simultaneously support and qualify our second hypothesis in that the importance
of the ability to think increased with age, but only as an addition to the capacities of
perceiving-and-suffering entities. Finally, a third and unpredicted developmental trend
was found with respect to the most elementary mental capacity, i.e. the ability to
perceive, which was weighed more heavily by older than younger participants. Possibly
this indicates that the older children and young adults took an entity’s perceptual
abilities to indicate that the entity was an animate living being, rather than a plant or a
lifeless object. In sum, these findings suggest that in the course of development an initial
focus on the ability to suffer is replaced by a pattern that is in line with Warren’s (1997)
plea for a multi-criterion approach to moral status assignment.
We measured moral status assignment by assessing respondents’ reactions to events
in which a target entity was hit, kicked or affected physically otherwise. It could be
argued that our focus on physical harm – rather than on other potential violations of an
entity’s rights, like keeping it captive – explains why the ability to suffer generally
contributed more to moral status assignment than the ability to think.1 The argument
would be that moral agents’ awareness that an entity is able to feel pain leads them to
feeling obliged to respect the entity’s physical integrity, but not necessarily to also
respect the entity’s autonomy in other ways, for example by granting it freedom of
movement. For moral agents to feel the latter type of obligation, the entity would also
need to possess higher order cognitive skills like being able to think.
If valid, this account would imply that moral status is not a unitary construct, but that
there are different types of moral status that would guarantee the status holder different
types of protection and that would be assigned on the basis of different criteria. Actually,
research on people’s attitudes towards using animals in scientific research has shown
that people may object to causing pain to particular animals while at the same time
considering it acceptable to keep those animals captive (Plous, 1996). Although we are
uncertain about how such an account could explain the age-related differences that we
found, we do think that future research should examine the possible multiplicity of
moral status by including other potential infringements of an entity’s autonomy,
including holding the entity captive.
Apart from providing qualified support for both hypotheses, the present results also
reveal that our three measures of moral status assignment are not fully equivalent. The
main differences were (1) that guilt and shame were more sensitive to whether the
victimized entities were or were not able to think and (2) that – possibly as a
consequence of the greater sensitivity to thinking – no age-related differences were
found for guilt and shame. These findings raise the issue of why a victimized entity’s
ability to think would affect attributions of guilt and shame to a perpetrator, but not
moral judgments about his or her behaviour.
1We are grateful to David Moshman for suggesting this point.
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In line with our rationale for including guilt and shame, it could be concluded that
moral affect actually is a more sensitive indicator of people’s moral attitude towards an
event than moral judgments. This would, in turn, imply that respondents in all age
groups actually used all three mental capacity criteria when assigning moral status.
However, an alternative interpretation is also possible. Specifically, the findings might
also reflect that guilt and shame are not only moral emotions, but social emotions as
well. Guilt might not only be an affective response to being involved in the causation of a
moral wrong, but also an attempt to repair any damage that might have been caused to
one’s relationship with the victim (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). When
seen from this perspective, guilt is most likely to arise when the victim has the ability to
respond positively to a perpetrator’s display of guilt, for example by thinking less
negatively about the perpetrator. Similarly, shame has a strong connotation of being
exposed to an audience that is likely to think negatively about one’s person (Crozier,
1998; Smith, Webster, Parott, & Eyre, 2002). Accordingly, both guilt and shame
responses can also be seen as attempts to alleviate someone else’s negative thoughts
about the self and these emotions are therefore most likely to arise when the victimized
entity can be expected to ‘think back’ in response to being harmed. When correct, this
interpretation implies that attributions of guilt and shame do not necessarily reflect the
respondents’ awareness that moral subjects have moral obligations to the affected
entity. Rather, they might also reflect the respondents’ awareness that the protagonist
might fear being seen in a negative light by the affected entity.
Future studies could distinguish between both interpretations of the moral affect
findings by including additional affective reactions that are similar to guilt and shame in
being social emotions, but that do not reflect the respondents’ moral attitude (e.g. fear
or embarrassment). When such emotional reactions would differentiate among the
affected entities in similar ways as guilt and shame did in the present study, this would
support the social emotion interpretation of our current findings. When non-moral
social emotions would differentiate among the affected entities in different ways, this
would support the moral status interpretation of the current moral affect findings.
The present study is not without limitations. One of these concerns the age range of
the children who were tested. Accordingly, it remains for future research to examine
how children younger than age 9 would assign moral status. Given the intimate
connection between the concept of harm and the ability to suffer, and given the fact that
the concept of harm occupies a central place in the moral thinking of even 3-year-old
children (Zelazo et al., 1996), it might be expected that even much younger children use
the ability to suffer as a criterion for moral status assignment.
Other limitations arise from the particular choices that were made when conducting
the study. For example, in all stories the perpetrators’ responsibility for the event was
similar in that their behaviour was unintentional, although they also could be accused of
exerting insufficient care. Future research should establish whether the results that
were obtained in the present study depend on factors like the perpetrators’
responsibility for the event and the severity of the damage that was caused.
While acknowledging the limitations of the present work, we also consider it as a
promising beginning that should be extended in several directions, one of these being
work on the generalizability of the present findings to other types of harmful behaviour
and to other categories of affected entities. Other possible extensions include work on
how moral status assignment is related to cultural factors and to the development of
children’s theory of mind and their knowledge of natural kinds.
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An issue that is raised by the present research, but not yet addressed, is whether the
concept of moral status can also play a role when explaining people’s differentially
negative moral judgments about harming fellow human beings. As suggested by the use
of similar concepts in explanations of contemporaries’ moral attitude towards the
treatment of slaves in previous centuries (see the example cited by Kahn, 2004), and of
Jews, Gypsies and homosexuals in 20th century Nazi-Germany (e.g. Koonz, 2003), this
might actually be the case. Actually, several relatively independent strands of research in
the social psychological literature have focused on the phenomenon that people do not
always consider their fellow human beings as being fully entitled to receive the benefits
that could result from considering their fate from a moral perspective. Some of the
concepts that are used in this literature, e.g. dehumanization (Bandura, Underwood, &
Fromson, 1975), infrahumanization (Vaes, Paladino, Castelli, Leyens, & Giovanazzi,
2003) and moral exclusion (Opotow, 1990), are aimed to explain the atrocities that
people sometimes commit against fellow human beings. Another such concept, i.e. the
circle of moral regard (Reed & Aquino, 2003) is aimed to explain why people differ in
terms of whether they only see family, kin and fellow citizens as being suitable targets of
their morally motivated prosocial behaviour, or whether they also see members of more
distant social groups as in-group members who should be helped when being in need.
Future work should examine whether the concept of moral status assignment as it is
used in the present paper can serve to enlighten and possibly even integrate the work in
these different strands of research on anti- and prosocial human–human interaction.
When taken together, we see the present study as a first attempt to bring the concept
of moral status from the realm of ethics into that of empirical developmental
psychological research. More work is needed to further examine how this approach can
enlighten our understanding of human moral thought and feeling and its development.
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